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4 December 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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TOP SECRET

4 December 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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	on Finland may	Gufler also believes treflect Moscow's conce	rn over th	e economic	25X1
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25X1 25X1	consul notes that their civilian supe Tshombe's forces	nt near the Elisabethville airpor UN military officers and men a eriors to authorize direct action . Bloody clashes could develor ing since 28 November, is foun	re urging n against o if the In-	25X 1
25X1	he was willing to arrived in Paris of evidence that he a	no told Senator Dodd on 29 Novemeet with Adoula, but not at Leon 3 December. There is as yes attempted to contact the Leopole wo-day stopover in Brazzaville (Backup,	eopoldville, et no firm dville govern-	25X1
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Turkey: The ending of 18 months of martial law and the vote of confidence given the new coalition government on 2 December will allow Premier Ismet Inonu to try to re-establish civilian parliamentary government. The government's margin in the vote of confidence, 269 of 450 seats, rested on the 170 votes of Inonu's Republican People's party plus a majority of the deputies of the Justice party, whose rank and file bitterly oppose the RPP. How long the present arrangement will last is uncertain. The moderate leadership of the Justice party agreed to partic-
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The moderate leadership of the Justice party agreed to partic-
ipate in a coalition with the RPP only under pressure from the military junta, which made it clear that the alternative to such
a coalition was continued rule by the military. Thus, if the new
government proves unable to handle its complex problems ef- 25X1
fectively or if the military considers its interests are jeopard- ized, another military takeover is likely to occur.
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25X1 Common Market: The Common Market (EEC) countries
may be heading for an early showdown on their increasingly di-
visive dispute over the further political development of the EEC.
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has informed Ambassador Mac- Arthur he will insist that the EEC foreign ministers "thrash out"
at their 10 December meeting the fundamental issues posed by
De Gaulle's draft treaty for a loose European confederation and
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25X1	I the second state of additional countries
	by the prospective entry into the EEC of additional countries which may not accept the Common Market's political objectives. Spaak fears that these issues, unless resolved, could mean the "death knell of European political unification." Backup, Page 4)
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*USSR: The <u>Izvestia</u> editorial of 3 December constitutes Moscow's first authoritative response to President Kennedy's interview with Aleksei I. Adzhubei. Although <u>Izvestia</u> conceded that the President had put forward "quite a few reasonable ideas," the generally querulous tone of the editorial seems to reflect the Soviet leaders' dissatisfaction with the outcome of this venture and underlines their sensitivity to some of the issues the President raised, such as the USSR's efforts to communize the entire world and the status of the countries of Eastern Europe.

The strong language employed in rejecting the concept of an international administration on the autobahn linking West Berlin with West Germany probably was intended to discourage the Western powers from introducing any formal proposals along these lines. <u>Izvestia</u> termed this concept a "worsened version of the occupation rights" in West Berlin which, it said, the US intends to "expand by infringing on the rights" of the East German regime. "Such plans," said <u>Izvestia</u>, "are doomed to failure."

The editorial portrayed the President's remarks regarding an arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as an "intention" to "reach agreement on a NATO commitment to live in peace with the Warsaw Pact nations." Izvestia also stated that "we can acclaim the President's commitment" not to transfer nuclear weapons to any country and his remark that he would be reluctant to see West Germany acquire a nuclear capacity of its own. Izvestia's effort to establish US "commitments" on these issues suggests that the USSR will seek to develop this line in any negotiations on Berlin and Germany.

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
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France-Algeria

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The American Embassy in Paris comments that the increased defiance of the government by rightists in France suggests a growing belief that the OAS can defeat De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The embassy noted, however, that rightists' hopes in metropolitan France are linked to the chances of the OAS in Algeria, the only place where the outcome can really be decided.

Meanwhile, the major cities of Algeria continue to be racked by inter-racial violence. PAG spokesmen in Tunis and at the UN have strongly protested European mob attacks on Moslems, alleging that the French security forces have tacitly condoned such actions. The PAG last week reportedly met to consider the political significance of these attacks, and it will probably be sensitive on the matter in view of its effort to strengthen its authority over urban Moslems in Algeria.

authority over urban Moslems in Algeria.	

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Dispute Over EEC Political Ties May Be Approaching Showdown

Adamant Belgian and Dutch opposition to De Gaulle's plan forced the cancellation of last week's meeting of the committee working on the treaty for a political union of the EEC countries, and Spaak himself took the initiative in calling for a meeting of foreign ministers. Brussels and The Hague differ in their objections to the French draft treaty, but, partly in order to prevent an early agreement, they have joined in insisting that Britain be brought into the talks at this stage. West Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg—although favoring a stronger union than that proposed by De Gaulle—have endorsed the French approach and, like Paris, hope the treaty can be signed by January.

From Spaak's remarks to MacArthur on 28 November, it is evident that his opposition to the French treaty--which he described as "actually retrogressive"--is fundamental. Spaak explained that at present the EEC treaty with its supranational features is "the bible" for European political unification. If the French treaty is pushed through, it will become "the bible," Spaak said, and subsequent efforts to move toward real political unification will be countered by the argument that the French treaty has modified the EEC treaty.

Spaak appears especially fearful that the confederation approach would play into the hands of prospective new members or associates of the EEC who desire to participate in the EEC's economic and commercial advantages but do not accept its political objectives. He has heretofore indicated some skepticism that Britain fully shares these objectives, and he is concerned lest the prospective association of the neutral states--Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria--have the effect of permanently braking the political development of the EEC. These three countries have been considering applying formally about mid-December for EEC association, conditional on exemptions designed to "protect" their neutrality.

As an architect of the EEC treaty, Spaak retains considerable influence in EEC circles, but it is difficult to say whether

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25X1	he will obtain additional support at the 10 December meeting. With the exception of the Dutch and Belgians, the other EEC countries regard the French plan as a "half loaf which is better than none," and they are anxious for early steps to tie West Germany more closely to Western Europe. Spaak's concern over the problem posed by the neutrals is probably more widely shared, but it is doubtful that the EEC is prepared to reject their applications for association out of hand—especially so when the USSR has increased its pressures on Finland and Austria.
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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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